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Chapter 12 
Social media and political communication 
Martin Molony 
 
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was widely regarded as being an internet election 
victory. Greengard (2009, 16) described Obama as ‘the first internet president’ and there was 
widespread agreement amongst political commentators and digital media experts as to ‘how 
politicians and the public interact [would] never be the same.’ In the days following Obama’s 
election, The New York Times reflected on the repetition of history in the effective use of a 
new medium: ‘One of the many ways that the election of Barack Obama as president has 
echoed that of John F. Kennedy is his use of a new medium that will forever change politics. 
For Mr Kennedy, it was television. For Mr Obama, it is the internet’ (Miller, 2008). 
Commentators, such as Huffington Post founder and editor-in-chief, Arianna Huffington 
(2008) went further and believed that the Obama win was entirely due to his use of the web: 
‘Were it not for the Internet, Barack Obama would not be president. Were it not for the 
Internet, Barack Obama would not have been the nominee.’ 
 
But was Obama’s win entirely down to successful use of the internet? Why did he win when, 
just four years earlier, Howard Dean had failed having used the same approach? One might 
assume that Barack Obama perfected Dean’s trial use of internet technologies but it is also 
reasonable to suggest that such electronic communication had come of age and that the 
electorate was sufficiently comfortable with the technologies to engage with their preferred 
candidate. The Web had intrinsically changed between the presidential elections of 2004 and 
2008 with the growth of Web 2.0 technologies, specifically the advent of social media. The 
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revolution promised by Web 2.0 was based on participation and interactivity rather that the 
publication / broadcast or one-way communication flow that had defined the Web up to then.  
Whatever about the medium itself, there can be little doubt that Obama’s candidacy was 
particularly suited to the use of an interactive, two-way communication facility provided by 
Web 2.0 in general and by social media in particular. As a community organiser, Obama 
understood the potential of crowdsourcing – and not just for financial support, but for idea 
generation and policy support also. For Obama, social media communication became an 
online version of both a sense of community for participants and in its use to organise and 
galvanise his supporters into action.  
 
Hoping to emulate Obama’s success, political candidates across the globe scrambled to adopt 
social media to their advantage. The UK’s 2010 general election was predicted to be the 
‘internet election’ but was dominated by the first televised leaders’ debates, with television 
providing the principal innovation of the campaign. It seemed that the internet and social 
media were more important in influencing how traditional media operated, rather than in 
influencing the outcome of the election itself. British print and broadcast media were able to 
harness the immediacy of social media responses to an event, often resulting in the social 
media response itself becoming the focus of the news coverage. For candidates, the most 
effective use of social media was in managing their campaign workers and in providing them 
with the most effective information for offline campaigning. Although the parties attempted 
to imitate Obama’s perceived success with social media – such as the Conservative Party’s 
creation of an e-campaign system, ‘MyCon’ – it became clear that whatever US social media 
success there had been, it could not be directly mapped onto the UK political landscape. But 
what about Ireland? This chapter considers the growing impact of social media for political 
communication in Ireland. It examines the extent to which the use of social media has been 
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adopted as a tool of political communication, the extent to which its use has been effective in 
election strategies and whether the employment of social media in such instances genuinely 
represents a significant change in political communication or whether social media is actually 
far closer to traditional methods of political communication than first appears. 
 
General election 2007 
Prior to Obama’s 2008 victory, Irish political candidates had not adopted web-based 
technologies to any great extent. The Irish general election of 2007 offered the first 
opportunity for a significant role for the internet by candidates and the media, the latter of 
which experimented with some exclusive Web events and the use of the Web to provide 
breaking news coverage. Citizen journalists provided an alternative media perspective with a 
number of bloggers providing some useful and popular online commentary on sites such as 
‘irishelection.com’ and ‘politics.ie’. Although there was some use of YouTube for party 
political programmes, with the Green Party using the site to premiere its party political 
broadcast, generally, the Web was not embraced with any great fervour by most candidates. 
A study of ‘cyber-campaigning’ in the 2007 campaign (Sudulich and Wall, 2009, 459) found 
that only a third of candidates set up personal web sites. This is surprising, given that a sole 
reliance on party-based web resources would only provide the same exposure as their party 
running mate(s). Although the use of electronic campaigning resources was significantly 
greater than in previous elections, clearly, 2007 general election candidates did not regard the 
use of the Web as a vital campaigning tool. 
 
This reluctance in taking web-based campaigning seriously may be explained by the 
traditional campaigning style of Irish elections. Personal contact with as many individual 
voters as possible is expected by both candidates and the electorate. A reported 69% of voters 
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had spoken with their chosen candidate during the 2002 election campaign (Marsh, 2008, 
256) while 60% of Irish voters reported that contact was made with their household, either by 
candidates or their representatives during the 2007 campaign (Sudulich and Wall, 2009, 458). 
The potential of the new media was described as ‘offering a public sphere, a new ‘town 
square’ that, with its emphasis on user-generated content, ‘might grow to offer truly 
alternative, citizen-oriented election coverage’ (Brandenburg, 2007, 184). However, in 
considering the effectiveness of media spending in this election, research has indicated that 
traditional printed posters and leaflets still produced the most significant return on investment 
(Sudulich and Wall, 2011). 
 
European election 2009 
The European Parliament elections of June 2009 offered a more US presidential-style 
opportunity for the use of social media in Irish politics. With an electorate of between 
778,502 and 861,727 voters in each of the four constituencies, the potential for personal voter 
contact was obviously limited and offered an Obama-style opportunity for the use of Web 
based technologies. In the run up to the 2009 election, a survey of all sitting European 
parliamentarians indicated a high use of personal web sites (75%) by the incumbent MEPs. 
On the social media front, just 21% of MEPs had a Twitter account with 62% either never 
having heard of Twitter or having no plans to use it. Similarly, 24% of the MEPs described 
themselves as using a blog extensively while 57% believed that TV was either a very 
effective or effective way to communicate with voters compared to 45% for print and 33% 
for online communication (Fleishman-Hillard, 2009).  
 
An analysis of the use of social media within the EU constituency of Dublin (O’Connor, 
2009) showed that six of the ten candidates had blogs, but that none of these generated 
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sufficient traffic to register on the social media measurement site ‘technorati.com’, indicating 
very low levels of traffic to these blogs. The same study noted that only 30% of the Dublin 
candidates had a presence on YouTube and that the activity levels, in terms of the number of 
videos, subscribers and views were all particularly low. O’Connor also found that, while nine 
of the ten candidates had a Facebook presence, the levels of support (friends) and levels of 
activity (posts) varied greatly. Successful Socialist Party candidate, Joe Higgins, led both 
criteria with 575 friends and 102 posts, while the unsuccessful Libertas candidate, Caroline 
Simmons, had just 84 friends and did not post to her Facebook page at all. There was no 
subsequent correlation between the levels of Facebook friends and the first-preference vote 
achieved by each candidate. 
 
Whatever about Fine Gael’s use of social media in the 2009 EU election in contributing to its 
success in winning over 29% of the vote and four of the 12 Irish seats, Feargal Purcell, the 
party’s deputy director of communications, was not convinced of the potency of social media: 
‘The evidence is that the electorate still gets its hard political information from TV and print’ 
(O’Connor, 2009, 77). This supports the view that it is not social media, per se, that offers a 
magic bullet, but that it is the application of social media to engage with the electorate that 
provides dividends at the ballot box. Other commentators recognised that, while the 
technology might allow for engagement between the electorate and candidates, provision of 
the technology does not necessarily mean that this happens. The Irish Times political 
correspondent and political blogger, Harry McGee, was unequivocal about suggestions of 
such engagement during the 2009 election campaign: ‘Two-way conversations have not 
opened up online in the Irish political parties and their supporters’ (O’Connor, 2009, 76). 
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Twitter’s impact 
Although only three years old in 2009, the micro-blogging service, Twitter, had enjoyed huge 
growth in the eighteen months before the 2009 European election. Twitter featured on the 
front page of Time magazine on the day of the election in Ireland, with a cover story 
proclaiming that ‘Twitter will change the way we live’ (Johnson, 2009). Statistics for the 
service showed a 1,460% rise in its worldwide audience over the previous twelve months, it 
having attracted 44.5 million unique visitors to its website during June 2009 alone 
(Schonfeld, 2009). Only six of the ten Dublin EU candidates had Twitter profiles during the 
campaign with incumbent Fianna Fáil MEP, Eoin Ryan, and Green Party challenger, Deirdre 
de Burca topping the poll of followers with 628 and 612 followers respectively, and with Joe 
Higgins not far behind with 526 followers. The remaining three candidates had only a 
fraction of this interest on Twitter (O’Connor, 2009).  
 
Despite this level of engagement with Twitter, it was not until early 2010 that its potential 
impact on the Irish political scene became apparent when it played a part in the resignation of 
a minister in the then Fianna Fáil – Green Party coalition government. It was Green Party 
chairman, Senator Dan Boyle’s prolific use of the medium that prompted calls from some of 
his parliamentary colleagues for him to stop his ‘irresponsible’ tweeting about political issues 
(Minihan, 2010).  Boyle’s use of Twitter certainly identified the potential of the medium, 
particularly capitalising on its semi-official nature. One could not have imagined many of 
Boyle’s views expressed via Twitter, which were presented as being shared by his party, 
being published as a party press release in the usual manner. Twitter seemed to provide a 
means to whisper an aside, but to the general populous. Somehow, publishing a statement 
within 140 characters seemed to provide a degree of latitude not otherwise permitted – or 
expected. The informality of the medium allowed Boyle to fan the flames of a given 
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controversy or to rekindle an affair that might otherwise have run its course. Indeed, it was 
one of Boyle’s missives that gave Willie O’Dea the honour of being the first politician to be 
tweeted out of office, when the latter had to step down as minister for defence in February 
2010. O’Dea had survived a vote of no confidence in the Dáil, following a revelation that he 
had sworn an inaccurate affidavit in defence of a slander action against him. He was forced to 
revise the affidavit when a recording of the offending slander was made public. Just as 
O’Dea’s position appeared to be safe, Boyle tweeted:  ‘As regards Minister O’Dea I don’t 
have confidence in him. His situation is compromised. Probably a few chapters in this story 
yet.’ As speculation on the minister’s future was rekindled, O’Dea was forced to resign a 
little over 24 hours later. 
 
In addition to being the catalyst for controversy, Twitter also came into its own for the extent 
to which it enabled coverage of political controversy. In May 2010 the Sunday Independent 
published an article detailing €81,015 claimed in expenses by Fianna Fáil Senator Ivor 
Callely. Subsequent news stories revealed that Callely had claimed travel expenses from a 
home in Co. Cork, some 370 kilometres from the Dáil – and his other home in Dublin’s 
suburb of Clontarf, in his former Dáil constituency of Dublin North Central and in which 
house, day-to-day appearances, suggested he still lived. The unfolding story caught the 
imagination of social media participants. An analysis of social media commentary over the 
following two months showed that some 5,000 tweets, or other social media comments, were 
made on the topic, while three days after the publication of the initial article, there were 584 
mentions of the senator during a 24 hour period (O’Leary, 2010). Most of this social media 
traffic was driven by messages on Twitter. 
 
303 
 
What is interesting about the social media coverage of the Callely affair was the extent to 
which those discussing it, based on their number of social media connections, were deemed 
to have a high ‘measure of influence’ – a measure calculated by a series of algorithms that 
takes into account multiple aspects of the individual author’s online profile, including but not 
limited to, the number of followers they have on Twitter; the number of friends on Facebook; 
the number of posts on a message board such as ‘boards.ie or ‘politics.ie’. The measure of 
influence of those talking about Ivor Callely ranged on a scale from 0 to 10 with 27% of the 
comments made by people with a measure of influence of 5 or higher; while 17% of the 
comments were made by people with an influence measure of 9 or 10 (O’Leary, 2010). This 
level of influence illustrates the extent to which Twitter, in particular, can impact on other 
forms of social media and on the agenda of traditional media. 
 
For other tweets, it is often only when traditional media, particularly print media, republish 
the messages, complete with interpretation and context that the tweets acquire potency. The 
release of some tweets places a perspective and / or opinion in the public domain that was 
previously known, or assumed, by media sources. The publication of these via Twitter 
provides carte blanche to correspondents to build a story around the tweet, thereby generating 
far more media coverage than might be expected from 140 characters. The media coverage of 
Dan Boyle’s Twitter traffic may have prompted fellow Cork South-Central TD, Simon 
Coveney, to attempt to garner similar public attention. Although this did not seem to come 
naturally to the Fine Gael deputy, he struck gold when he tweeted a comment on a 
particularly poor performance by then Taoiseach Brian Cowen in the now infamous ‘Morning 
Ireland’ radio interview of September 2010. Although Coveney’s tweet was not the first to 
comment on Cowen’s performance, his wording – ‘God, what an uninspiring interview by 
Taoiseach this morning. He sounded half way between drunk and hungover and totally 
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disinterested . . .’ – offered the media an opportunity to push the story into new territory, in 
particular, the then Taoiseach’s drinking habits. 
 
Coveney’s tweet prompted international media coverage, with some 457 articles published in 
the 24 hours following the tweet, appearing in publications in 26 countries, including the 
USA, UK, India and China (O’Leary, 2010a). The wording of Coveney’s tweet demonstrates 
the ‘aside type commentary’ that is afforded by Twitter. It is difficult to imagine that such a 
remark would have been issued in a press release – or even during an interview with a 
journalist. Although the deputy did not accuse Cowen of being either drunk or hungover, by 
suggesting that he sounded like this legitimised the media questions that were put to an 
unsuspecting Cowen later that morning. While there had been previous comment in media 
circles about his drinking habits, it had been regarded as inappropriate or off-limits to broach 
the subject. Whatever about the wisdom of Cowen going on live radio while sounding hoarse, 
his response to the social media coverage demonstrated a serious lack of awareness by Fianna 
Fáil in monitoring social media traffic and in failing to properly gauge the potential fallout. 
 
Of course, the informality of Twitter has not always worked to the advantage of the tweeting 
party. Some of Dan Boyle’s messages may have crossed the line from time to time. In 
particular, his 2011 comment on the arrest of the managing director of the IMF, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, on foot of allegations of sexual assault in an upmarket New York hotel –
‘Strauss-Kahn sexual assault allegations are of course of the utmost seriousness, but paying 
$3,000 for a hotel room isn’t all that far behind’ – resulted in a backlash. While such a remark 
might have gone without too many ripples – or even unnoticed – had it been made as part of 
an informal conversation or speech, Twitter, despite appearing to be a transitory medium, 
does appear in ‘writing’ and, as with traditional media the written word remains ‘on the 
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record’. Boyle soon back-peddled on his association of a humorous remark with an 
accusation of a sexual crime: ‘In the words of Hilary Clinton, I miscommunicated – and 
badly, it seems.’ 
 
General election 2011 
The 2011 general election saw a significant increase in the use of internet tools and social 
media, placing the medium alongside traditional media. Two social media platforms in 
particular, had, by this time, been engaged with by a critical mass of the Irish electorate and 
were adopted by candidates in a meaningful way. Facebook reported some two million Irish 
accounts, while just-under 200,000 Irish people had Twitter accounts. Accordingly, the 2011 
election candidates focussed their social media efforts principally on these two services: 79% 
of the 566 candidates had a Facebook account, while 57% had Twitter accounts (McMahon, 
2011).  
 
The main political parties sought the advice and expertise of international social media 
consultants, some of whom had been associated with Barack Obama’s success just three 
years previously. Each of the party’s websites was integrated with social media, with links to 
their presence on Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and YouTube. In addition, the websites invited 
visitors to keep up-to-date through email subscriptions – and, of course, invitations to join the 
campaign. 
 
The most dramatic use of the Web in the 2011 campaign was Fine Gael’s conversion of their 
existing website to a three-page site, featuring a video of an informal Enda Kenny inviting the 
public to comment on what was wrong with the country. The site also featured pages on 
‘How we can improve the country’ and ‘How can we win your support?’ Although the site 
306 
 
generated a lot of media commentary and appeared to engage the public in offering their 
opinions, the height of attention was garnered from the fact that the site was hacked within a 
week. The site was transformed several times during the campaign, with the party claiming 
400,000 hits (Wall, 2011, 96). The party also created a ‘digital task force’ of 30 full-time 
volunteers to drive their digital strategy, which included the creation of an ‘e-canvasser’ tool 
similar to that adopted by Obama in 2008, allowing the party to organise and manage their 
supporters. 
 
The Labour Party also adapted its website in an innovative manner with constituency specific 
video messages featuring Eamon Gilmore, links for which could be emailed to others by 
those visiting the site. This represented an interesting application of the technology to provide 
targeted material, but which was driven by user interaction. The party broke new ground with 
the provision of an iPhone ‘app’ that allowed users to follow the party leader’s public 
appearances via an interactive map and view images of party hustings. Party political use of 
Twitter before and during the 2011 election campaign demonstrated some strategic thinking 
in how to maximise its impact, rather than just attempting to blindly build a large group of 
‘followers’. Attempts made to develop a distinct relationship with Twitter followers include 
Fianna Fáil’s announcement, first on Twitter, of the results of its leadership contest shortly 
before the campaign. Other parties released sections of policy documents first to social media 
followers before releasing them more generally. 
 
Such attempts at a strategic use of Twitter took place against a background of Twitter-based 
controversies that had managed to capture the public – and media – imagination in the 18 
months prior to the election. While Twitter was a significant element of the 2011 campaign, it 
was generally more gainfully employed by the observers, rather than by the participants, 
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including media organisations, political commentators and interested members of the 
electorate. Voters with a particularly well-informed view on a given topic could now 
contribute to online public debate alongside the political candidates – often getting a head 
start on the debate as Twitter discussions grew organically while candidates were embroiled 
in television or radio debates on the topic. The use of Twitter hashtags such as #ge11, 
(general election 2011), #rtedeb (RTÉ leaders’ debate), #tv3ld (TV3 leaders’ debate) 
provided online banners under which people gathered to follow and contribute to on-going 
discussions. The level of engagement in political conversation using social media could be 
seen in the levels of Twitter traffic around these hashtags: 63,000 tweets were sent using the 
#ge11 hashtag during the final four days of the campaign, while a further 22,000 were sent on 
the first day of the count (Healy, 2011). What was particularly interesting in the use of 
hashtags was the extent to which discussions grew using media hashtags such as #vinb 
(TV3’s Vincent Browne Show), #lastword (Last Word radio show), #sixone (RTÉ’s Six-One 
News), #twip (RTÉ’s The Week in Politics) and #rtept (RTÉ’s Prime Time). The widespread 
adoption of these hashtags meant that Twitter conversations and debates evolved around 
particular media programmes, often in parallel to the actual broadcast and sometimes in 
response to topics prompted by the producers. This parallel media experience, referred to as 
social viewing / listening was to become a challenge and opportunity for broadcasters. They 
could no longer expect to hold the exclusive attention of their audiences – but the flip side 
was the opportunity to feature centrally in the parallel social media conversation. 
 
For party-based candidates, headquarters provided advice, training and support. There were 
attempts by most of the main parties at a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the adoption of social 
media by candidates. However, as with any skillset, there was a great variance in the 
expertise and experience across the range of candidates. The extent of the lower end of the 
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spectrum of social media experience was evident in the story of one incumbent politician 
asking for his social media communications to be restricted to voters in his constituency. The 
irony of a ‘social’ media being used by an organisation to emulate the expressions of 
individuals was not lost on social media commentator, Suzy Byrne (2011), who was 
unequivocal in her view of the use of social media accounts on a party-wide scale: 
‘Candidates who hand over control of their personal accounts to someone else are silly, 
parties who take control of their candidates accounts give the impression of a) having no faith 
in their candidates or b) having no clue or c) complete paranoia of message control.’ 
 
For independent candidates, social media could provide the proverbial level playing field, 
particularly if the candidate was prepared to really engage with voters. The 2011 election 
attracted 235 candidates outside the main five parties, with some 189 of these being free of 
any party affiliations (Wall, 2011). This was the greatest number of independent candidates 
in any Dáil election and provided an opportunity for the electorate to move away from 
traditional party politics. One such independent was 23-year-old student candidate, Dylan 
Haskins, who seemed to understand social media best practice: ‘I’m taking questions from 
constituents and answering them on my website. It’s a conversation, not a speech. It’s a way 
of communicating with people’ (Devlin, 2011). While candidate Haskins never made it to 
Deputy Haskins, successful independent candidates did ensure that they were sufficiently 
covered on the social media front. For example, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan had over 3,000 
Twitter followers during the campaign, together with some 1,700 Facebook ‘likes’, while 
Michael Lowry boasted over 5,000 Facebook friends. 
 
There were mixed opinions on the extent to which such electronic campaigning translated 
into votes. Positive correlations were found between a candidate’s popularity on Facebook or 
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Twitter and the number of first preference votes they received (McMahon, 2011). However, 
this is just as likely to be an indication of the stronger candidates having adequately covered 
themselves on these social media platforms, rather than their election success having been 
due to their social media activities. Correlations can be made between the levels of internet 
activity by Fine Gael and the party’s gradually-increasing support throughout the campaign, 
mapped by the various campaign polls. Much was made of the party’s e-canvasser tool, based 
on Obama’s 2008 approach and Fine Gael’s temporary substitution of its party website and 
its use of Twitter. However, Fine Gael was also the largest opposition party to a government 
whose unpopularity was unprecedented, with a significant proportion of the electorate 
favouring anybody but Fianna Fáil.  
 
Despite buying in the best advice on the subject, most candidates still failed to understand the 
‘social’ part of social media. Many still considered this new form of communication as just 
another channel through which they should ‘broadcast’ their message to the electorate. The 
other misunderstanding that most candidates had was about the personal nature of social 
media. Given that it is an individual who subscribes, or follows, a particular social media 
account, it is most effective when the tone is that of an individual conversation, rather than an 
en masse ‘my constituents’ approach. The growth in the use of mobile devices to access 
social media services has increased this expectation of a personalised experience. 
Experiencing social media in this way suggests a personal relationship and, ironically, a level 
of privacy in the manner in which one communicates. It is not that social media participants 
expect the development of a unique relationship with each and every follower or subscriber, 
but that the attitude and tone of communication would be more closely related to a personal 
conversation rather than to a town hall meeting. 
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Creating, developing and maintaining social media communication in such a personal manner 
is time consuming. It also requires the ability to be comfortable with the conversational tone 
required. Most importantly, if it is to work well, it requires genuine engagement that can only 
work with two-way communication. In some respects, this is one of the hallmarks of Irish 
politics, i.e. that such a high number of voters have traditionally met and spoken to their 
preferred candidates. However, with some notable exceptions, the 2011 election campaign 
did not allow this traditional personal contact to transfer to social media conversations. 
Mirroring the perceived role of social media in the previous year’s UK election, political 
commentator, Kevin Rafter, echoing the views of many commentators, was unambiguous 
about the overstated expectation of social media: ‘Social media got plenty of attention, but in 
terms of political communication the 2011 election was all about television, and, in 
particular, about the televised leaders’ debates’ (Farrell et al, 2011).  
 
Again, one must ask if the interactivity provided by social media is needed in a society where 
relatively easy access to personal contact with existing and aspiring deputies already exists. 
Conversely, as social media grows in everyday use, perhaps it will provide the means by 
which the electorate can continue to enjoy personal contact with their preferred candidates, 
but by electronic means. As to the impact of social media use on a candidate’s potential for 
success in the 2011 general election, correlations have been made that suggest successful 
candidates had a higher social media profile (McMahon, 2011; Curran and Singh, 2011). 
However, one has to question the cause and effect for such correlations. Was the use of social 
media a determining factor in their electoral success or did the better-placed / better-
resourced candidates ensure that they had an effective social media strategy? It is difficult to 
prove the former, while the latter could be assumed of all forms of political communication. 
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Presidential election 2011 
If the social media revolution was to have the anticipated impact on Irish politics, then the 
Irish presidential election of 2011 would offer an opportunity to see this in action. 
Effectively, the entire state represented a single constituency for each candidate. Presidential 
elections are also, by definition, more personality focussed than other Irish elections. Given 
these factors, social media should provide a means to connect directly with potential voters 
and to represent the personal voice of the candidate to electors and to the media. Little did 
anyone know at the outset that a single tweet would ultimately tilt the balance to determine 
the outcome. With seven candidates, the 2011 election was to provide the greatest ever range 
of choice in an Irish presidential election. The inclusion of four independent candidates also 
diluted the influence of party allegiances in determining the outcome. These factors should 
have increased the potential for social media to influence the ebb and flow of electoral 
support during the campaign – whatever about influencing, or determining, the outcome. 
 
In his analysis of the adoption of social media throughout the campaign, Ciarán McMahon, of 
candidate.ie, pointed to the ‘upward only’ general trend of social media followers, in that 
social media users rarely ‘unfollow’ or unlike accounts. Although McMahon was to revise 
that contention slightly as the campaign unfolded, the observation is a valid one and must be 
borne in mind when attempting to make any link between social media support and electoral 
support – each voter has only one vote, but can like as many candidates as takes their fancy. 
Despite that health warning, the five-week analysis of the social media ‘support’ for each 
candidate reflects the cut and thrust of the campaign as the ultimate real contenders became 
apparent. By the final week of the campaign, social media figures reflected the opinion poll 
results of a two-horse race between Seán Gallagher and Michael D. Higgins. While there was 
certainly a correlation between social media support and electoral support, it is likely that the 
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social media support was reflecting the wider electoral support, rather than the former 
determining the latter (see ‘candidate.ie’, blog entries at pages 1364, 1393, 1405, 1415 and 
1430).  
 
It was widely accepted throughout the campaign that Seán Gallagher was the candidate that 
was most effectively harnessing the potential of social media (Browne, 2011). As an 
independent candidate, the numbers of followers he garnered on Facebook and Twitter were 
impressive. Despite this, Gallagher was at one with each of the other candidates in using 
social media as a ‘broadcast’ medium, to ‘push’ their communications to voters. None of the 
presidential hopefuls adopted any aspect of social media in an interactive manner, either by 
inviting followers to influence the campaign or, indeed, in putting a question to their 
followers via social media. Whatever advantage the party-based candidates might have had in 
accessing other resources, very little attempt was made to harness the network of social 
media accounts of fellow-party politicians. When one considers the number of friends and 
followers connected with each individual account, it is quite surprising that party strategists 
did not capitalise on this social media potential.  
 
Despite the social media shortcomings of the 2011 presidential election campaign, it will be 
remembered for the impact of social media on the outcome, or rather, the impact of one tweet 
in the dying days of the campaign. As the candidates gathered in an RTÉ studio for a final 
campaign debate hosted by the ‘Frontline’ current affairs programme, Seán Gallagher 
enjoyed a substantial lead in the polls that appeared to be growing as polling day approached. 
This lead was to be swept aside within 24 hours following the airing of a bogus tweet 
promising the appearance, at a press conference, of a witness to Gallagher’s collection of 
funds for Fianna Fáil. This announcement seemed to completely wrong-foot Gallagher and 
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his inability to provide a solid response was reflected in the negative reaction of the studio 
audience. The swing against him was reflected in final opinion polls published in the 
following days before a media-blackout took effect.  
 
Conclusion  
‘Tweet-gate’, as the Gallagher affair came to be known, represented something of a 
watershed in the relationship between media (old and new) and politics. Many have attributed 
Gallagher’s fall at the final hurdle to the use or abuse of social media; others have blamed 
sloppy journalism in the failure of the ‘Frontline’ team not to validate the source or content of 
the tweet. Others disregard the manner, or means, of the communication and point to the 
revelation of close ties between Gallagher and Fianna Fáil that had not previously been 
publicised. It is in this latter explanation that the truth about the potential of social media for 
Irish politics is to be found. In itself, social media will not radically change Irish political life. 
However, as a means to an end it does present important opportunities for new modes of 
genuinely two-way political communication. Regretfully, the most beneficial use of social 
media – that of real engagement with the electorate – is likely to be ignored in favour of its 
potential to damage opposing candidates’ campaigns or to abuse politicians in relation to 
policy. The tragic suicide of Fine Gael TD, Shane MacEntee in December 2012 following 
persistent and anonymous abusive comments that were directed towards him on social media 
websites was a stark reminder of the potency of such technologies and the multitude of 
purposes to which they can be put.  
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